The Province of Ontario’s Nuclear Emergency Response Plan has been developed pursuant to Section 8 of the Emergency Management and Civil Protection Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E. 9 (hereafter referred to as the Emergency Management and Civil Protection Act or EMCPA). The current edition of this plan supersedes and replaces all older versions which should be destroyed.
Holders of the Provincial Nuclear Emergency Response Plan Implementing Plan for the Darlington Nuclear Generating Station are responsible for keeping it updated by incorporating amendments, which may be issued from time to time.
This public document is administered by the Minister of Community Safety and Correctional Services of Ontario.
The structure for nuclear and radiological emergency response planning in Ontario, which is illustrated in the diagram on the previous page, consists of the following components:
- The Emergency Management and Civil Protection Act (EMCPA) requires and authorizes the formulation of the plan.
- The Provincial Nuclear Emergency Response Plan (PNERP):
- Developed pursuant to Section 8 of the EMCPA and subject to Cabinet approval:
- The Master Plan: sets out the overall principles, policies, basic concepts, organizational structures and responsibilities.
- The Implementing Plans: the elements of the Master Plan are applied to each major nuclear site, transborder emergencies and other types of radiological emergencies, and detailed provincial implementing plans developed. The Major Organization Plans (as per Figure I on page ii) should be consistent with the requirements under these implementing plans.
- Major Organization Plans : Each major organization involved (provincial ministries, agencies, boards and commissions, municipalities, and nuclear organizations, etc.) develops its own plan to carry out the relevant roles, responsibilities and tasks agreed to by them and consistent with their mandate. These plans are based on, and should be consistent with the PNERP and with the Provincial Implementing Plans.
- Procedures : Based on all of the above plans, procedures are developed for the various emergency centres to be set up and for the various operational functions required.
- Checklists : The culmination of the planning process is the development of checklists based on the requirements of the procedures, e.g., individual position or function-specific checklists.
It is necessary that everyone involved in the preparation and implementation of the Provincial Nuclear Emergency Response Plan employ common terminology. The terminology contained in the Glossary, Annex C, should be used for this purpose by all concerned. Further reference information can be found in the IMS doctrine at www.ontario.ca/ims.
ADM - Assistant Deputy Minister
AECL - Atomic Energy of Canada Limited
AIM - Abnormal Incident Manual
ALARA - ‘As low as reasonably achievable’
AMG - Assurance Monitoring Group
BWR - Boiling Water (nuclear) Reactor
CANDU - The name of the Canadian developed nuclear power reactor system (from Canada Deuterium Uranium)
CCEM - Cabinet Committee on Emergency Management
CEMC - Community Emergency Management Coordinator
CEM - Commissioner of Emergency Management
CESC - Corporate Emergency Support Centre
CEOC - Community Emergency Operations Centre
CEOF - Corporate Emergency Operations Facility
CNSC - Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission
CRC - Corporate Response Centre
CRL - Chalk River Laboratories
CZ - Contiguous Zone
DNGS - Darlington Nuclear Generating Station
EB - Emergency Bulletin
ECI - Emergency Coolant Injection
EFADS - Emergency Filtered Air Discharge System
EMCPA - Emergency Management and Civil Protection Act
EIC - Emergency Information Centre
EI - Emergency Information
EIS - Emergency Information Section
EMO - Emergency Management Ontario
EOC - Emergency Operations Centre
EPZ - Emergency Planning Zone
ERAP - Emergency Response Assistance Plan
ER - Emergency Response
ERMG - Environmental Radiation Monitoring Group
FADS - Filtered Air Discharge System
FDA - Food and Drug Administration
FNEP - Federal Nuclear Emergency Plan
GOC - Government Operations Centre
GPMP - General Province-Wide Monitoring Plan
GPMG - General Province Wide Monitoring Group
Gy - Gray. See definition of Absorbed Dose in Glossary, Annex C
HAZMAT - Hazardous Material
HC - Health Canada
IAEA - International Atomic Energy Agency
INES - International Nuclear Event Scale
JTCC - Joint Traffic Control Centre
JTCP - Joint Traffic Control Plan
KI - Potassium Iodide
km - Kilometre
LGIC - Lieutenant Governor In Council
LHDR - Laurentian Hills Deep River
LHDRRNEPC- Laurentian Hills Deep River Regional Nuclear Emergency
LOCA - Loss-of-Coolant Accident
LOECI - Loss of Emergency Coolant Injection
MCSCS - Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services
MCSS - Ministry of Community and Social Services
MDU - Monitoring & Decontamination Unit
MEMC - Ministry Emergency Management Coordinator
MEOC - Ministry Emergency Operations Centre
Met - Meteorology, meteorological
MMAH - Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing
MNDMF - Ministry of Northern Development, Mines and Forestry
MNR - Ministry of Natural Resources
MOE - Ministry of the Environment
MEI - Ministry of Energy and Infrastructure
MOHLTC - Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care
MOL - Ministry of Labour
mSv - Millisievert
MTO - Ministry of Transportation Ontario
NIG - Nuclear Incident Group
NEMCC - Nuclear Emergency Management Coordinating Committee
OMAFRA - Ontario Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs
OPG - Ontario Power Generation
OPP - Ontario Provincial Police
PAL - Protective Action Level
PNERP - Provincial Nuclear Emergency Response Plan
PNGS - Pickering Nuclear Generating Station
PWR - Pressurized Water (nuclear) Reactor
PHWR - Pressurized Heavy Water (nuclear) Reactor
PEOC - Provincial Emergency Operations Centre
PZ - Primary Zone
rad - See definition of Absorbed Dose in Glossary, Annex C
RAG - Regional Action Group
RD - Radiological Device
RDD - Radiological Dispersal Device
rem - See definition of Equivalent Dose in Glossary, Annex C
RHRP - Radiation Health Response Plan
RNEMCC - Regional Nuclear Emergency Management Coordinating Committee
SRP - Site Reference Plan
SMC - Site Management Centre
Sv - Sievert. See definition of Equivalent Dose in Glossary, Annex C
SZ - Secondary Zone
TRF - Tritium Removal Facility
TLD - Thermoluminescent Dosimeter
UTM - Universal Transverse Mercator
WHO - World Health Organization
The aim of the Provincial Nuclear Emergency Response Plan (PNERP) Implementing Plan for the Darlington Nuclear Generating Station (DNGS) is to prescribe the measures that should be undertaken to deal with a nuclear emergency caused by an accident/event at the DNGS.
1.2.1 This implementing plan should be read and applied in the context of the PNERP, Master Plan.
1.2.2 In case of any apparent differences between the provisions of the PNERP Master Plan and this Implementing Plan, the latter being more detailed and specific is applicable.
1.2.3 Together, these two plans focus on provincial level actions and should therefore be supplemented by the appropriate municipal and other plans and procedures (sections 1.3 to 1.5 below).
1.3.1 The Regional Municipality of Durham is the designated (Primary Zone) municipality with respect to DNGS (PNERP Master Plan, Annex A).
1.3.2 The City of Toronto and the City of Peterborough are the designated (Host) municipalities with respect to DNGS (PNERP Master Plan, Annex A).
1.3.3 Municipal Plans for dealing with a DNGS nuclear emergency shall be developed by these designated municipalities, as per the PNERP Master Plan, section 1.8.
1.3.4 Plans of lower tier municipalities within the Region of Durham shall conform to the Municipal Plan.
1.3.5 Municipal Plans shall cover the offsite emergency response arrangements and activities of the designated municipalities, municipal departments, boards, and police services and shall assign them roles and responsibilities, consistent with this Plan.
1.3.6 The plans prepared by the designated municipalities, and by these other organizations, are collectively referred to as “municipal plans” in this document.
1.3.7 In this document the terms “municipal” and “municipality” shall include, unless the context indicates otherwise, the designated municipality, as well as the local police service and local boards whose area of operation includes the area covered by the municipal plans.
1.4.1 A Joint Traffic Control Plan shall be developed by the Darlington Joint Traffic Control Committee for the area likely to be affected by a DNGS nuclear emergency.
1.4.2 Representatives of MTO, provincial and local police services, municipal road authorities and emergency services who have jurisdiction over the areas and road networks affected, should be members of, or cooperate with, the Darlington Joint Traffic Control Committee.
1.4.3 During a nuclear emergency, the Joint Traffic Control Plan for a DNGS emergency should be implemented by the representatives at the Joint Traffic Control Centre (JTCC) (paragraph 2.7.3) under the guidance and direction of the Municipal Emergency Operations Centre (EOC), and the Provincial Emergency Operations Centre (PEOC).
1.4.4 The JTCC has authority for the management of evacuating traffic in the Primary Zone as well as the traffic impact beyond it, as detailed in the Joint Traffic Control Plan.
1.4.5 The Joint Traffic Control Plan shall be designed to meet the requirements of the provincial and municipal nuclear emergency plans. For specific guidance see the following:
(a) Paragraph 2.7.3 Joint Traffic Control Centre
(b) Paragraph 2.10 Telecommunications
(c) Section 3.3 Internal Notifications
(d) Paragraph 3.7 Activation of Emergency Plans – Immediate Actions
(e) Section 4.6 Entry Control
(f) Section 4.7 Evacuation
(g) Section 4.9 Traffic Control
1.4.6 The Joint Traffic Control Plan defines the traffic management measures to be undertaken and shall include:
(a) The organizational representatives at the JTCC, their roles, responsibilities, communications and reporting arrangements to their respective municipalities.
(b) The lead agency for implementation of the Joint Traffic Control Plan during a nuclear emergency response.
(c) The location of the JTCC and how it is equipped to monitor traffic flows and communicate with other emergency operations centres.
Other jurisdictions and organizations that have, or are assigned, some responsibility for responding to a DNGS emergency should develop appropriate plans/procedures for carrying out their roles and tasks. They include:
(a) Provincial ministries.
(b) Designated municipality’s departments, local police services, local boards and other agencies assigned roles and responsibilities in the municipal plans.
(c) Ontario Power Generation (OPG) and DNGS.
(d) Host municipalities (paragraph 2.7.6).
2.1.1 DNGS is located in the Municipality of Clarington at latitude 43°52' North and longitude 78°43' West, on the northern shore of Lake Ontario.
2.1.2 The Darlington nuclear facility consists of one power generating station with four Canada Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) nuclear reactors, each having an electric power generating capacity of 881 megawatts. The installation also contains a Tritium Removal Facility, which is housed in a portion of the heavy water (D2O) management building, a separate structure from the main nuclear generating station. Figure 2.1 shows a schematic diagram of a CANDU reactor.
2.1.3 References in this document to the Darlington Nuclear Generating Station (DNGS) or the Darlington station include the Tritium Removal Facility unless stated otherwise, or the context indicates otherwise.
2.2.1 If an accident were to occur at DNGS, the most probable result would be that its effects would be confined within the station boundary.
2.2.2 Basic Offsite Effect
(a) Less probable is an accident which would cause the “basic offsite effect” discussed in the PNERP Master Plan, (paragraph 2.3.3). Such an accident would likely result in a Partial Activation response by the PEOC (see Chapter 3).
(b) The principal characteristics of the basic offsite effect would be:
(i) A warning period would usually exist before the offsite effects occur.
(ii) The main hazard to people would be from external exposure to, and inhalation of radionuclides.
(iii) Doses would be low. (For planning purposes it can be assumed that the individual dose to the most exposed person at the station boundary will not exceed 250 mSv (25 rem)).
(iv) Environmental contamination would be limited to very low levels.
(v) Low-level radioactive emissions to the environment could continue for some time (i.e., days or weeks).
(vi) The impact would be mainly confined to the Primary Zone around the nuclear station (paragraph 2.4.2 below).
(b) An example of an accident scenario resulting in a basic offsite effect is a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA), with the following typical progression:
(i) After an initial puff release of radioactivity from the reactor building, this building would “box-up”, preventing any further immediate releases. A “box-up” is a condition whereby all possible pathways to the environment, such as ventilation stacks, are sealed.
(ii) Ducts connecting the reactor building to the vacuum building would open, thereby reducing the former’s internal pressure to below atmospheric pressure, drawing all radioactive material released from the damaged reactor fuel into the vacuum building. During this retention period the contained radioactivity would decay.
(iii) Suitable meteorological conditions may make it possible to vent some of this contained radioactivity through filters in a direction away from populated areas. It may be possible to do this several times.
(iv) If at any stage the pressure in the containment system nears atmospheric pressure, the contained radioactivity will be vented through filters to the environment. Such venting could be intermittent or continuous, but may last for some weeks. The level of radioactivity being released would progressively decline with time.
FIGURE 2.1 : NUCLEAR GENERATING UNIT SCHEMATIC –
CANDU PRESSURIZED HEAVY WATER REACTOR*
2.2.3 More Severe Accident
(a) An even less probable accident is one which could cause more severe offsite effects. Such an accident would likely result in a Full Activation response by the PEOC.
(b) A more severe accident would be defined by one or more of the following:
(i) The time between the accident and any release of radioactivity may be generally limited.
(ii) Radiation doses could be high – greater than 250 mSv (25 rem) for the most exposed person at the station boundary.
(iii) Radioiodines and particulates could form a component of the radioactive emission.
(iv) Environmental contamination could be quantitatively significant in both extent and duration.
(v) The area affected could be larger than that for the basic offsite effect.
(c) Accidents which could result in some or all of the above offsite effects would generally involve some form of failure of the containment system (either an impairment or a bypassing) and/or reduced filter efficiency as part of an accident which releases significant amounts of radioactive material from damaged reactor fuel.
2.2.4 Tritium Removal Facility (TRF)
(a) The radiological hazard from an accident at the TRF would arise from the release to the environment of tritium, tritiated water, and tritiated water vapour.
(b) The airborne pathway would carry tritium gas and tritiated water vapour in the downwind direction, thus creating a potential hazard from external exposure to, and inhalation of radioactive material.
(c) The waterborne pathway would carry tritiated water into the lake (either directly or after draining into the ground), thus creating a potential hazard from the ingestion of radioactively contaminated water or fish. Such a liquid release from the TRF shall be dealt with as prescribed in the Provincial Liquid Emission Response Procedure.
The protective measures available for minimizing the radiation hazard in a nuclear emergency are listed in Table 2.2 and are defined in the glossary (Annex C). The operational use of these measures is prescribed in appropriate sections of this plan.
2.4.1 Contiguous Zone
(a) The Contiguous Zone comprises Response Sector D1 (see Figure 2.3), and includes an area adjacent to the DNGS boundary from Courtice Road to Martin Road and extending north to Darlington Baseline Road.
(b) The Contiguous Zone is the area immediately surrounding the nuclear installation out to an approximate radius of 3 kilometers.
2.4.2 Primary Zone
(a) The Primary Zone for DNGS is shown in Figure 2.3. It includes an area of the Regional Municipality of Durham bounded generally by Taunton Road to the north, Wilmot Creek to the east, and Park Road (RR 54) to the west. The zone extends southward into Lake Ontario to a radius of 10 km from DNGS. The exact boundaries of the zone can be determined from Annex A.
(b) The Primary Zone, which includes the Contiguous Zone, is the area around the nuclear installation within which detailed planning and preparedness shall be carried out for measures against exposure to a radioactive emission. The approximate radius is 10 kilometers.
2.4.3 Secondary Zone
(a) The Secondary Zone encompasses all areas of Durham Region, the City of Toronto, York Region, the City of Kawartha Lakes, Northumberland County and Peterborough County within a 50 km radius of DNGS. The Secondary Zone is shown in Figure 2.4 and includes both the Contiguous and Primary Zones. Figure 2.4 also shows the sub-zones of the Secondary Zone.
(b) The Secondary Zone is the area within which it is necessary to plan and prepare for taking Ingestion Control Measures, based on the monitoring of the food chain for contamination.
2.5.1 The Primary Zone for DNGS is divided into 16 Response Sectors which fall into the following sector rings around the station:
- Inner Ring (Contiguous Zone)
- D1 and Lake Sector D14
- Middle Ring
- D2, D3, D4, D5, and lake sector D15
- Outer Ring
- D6A, D6B, D7, D8A, D8B, D9, D10, D11, D12, D13, and lake sector D16.
The boundaries of the Response Sectors are shown in Figure 2.3, and are detailed in Annex A.
2.6.1 Planning Times for Radioactive Emissions
The time interval between the occurrence of an accident at DNGS and the commencement of an emission depends on the condition and functioning of the station containment system and on the effectiveness of the actions taken by station operators to delay repressurization of the vacuum structure thus prolonging the holdup of radioactive material within containment:
(a) For a normally functioning containment system, a minimum interval of 7 days (between the occurrence of the accident and the commencement of an emission) may be used for planning purposes.
(b) When venting does commence, it could be intermittent, with the emission lasting for many weeks.
(c) If however, the containment system is either impaired, breached or bypassed, an emission could commence much earlier; in some cases, very soon after the accident. With an impaired containment, the emission may be continuous.
2.6.2 Population Data
Estimates of the Primary Zone sector population figures are contained in Annex B.
Exposure Control Measures
- Entry Control
- Thyroid Blocking
- Use of Protective Equipment
Ingestion Control Measures
- Milk Control
- Water Control
- Pasture Control
- Produce and Crop Control
- Livestock Control
- Food Control
- Land Control**
- Environmental Decontamination*
Table 2.2 : Protective Measures
Note: These measures are described and discussed in the PNERP Master Plan, Chapter 6 and are defined in the Glossary, Annex C of this plan.
FIGURE 2.3 : PRIMARY ZONE AND RESPONSE SECTORS
FIGURE 2.4 : SECONDARY ZONE AND SUB-ZONES
2.7.1 The Provincial Emergency Response Organization for dealing with a DNGS emergency is shown in Figure 2.5.
Overall coordination is provided by the PEOC. Details on the roles and functions of the various elements of this organization are laid down in the PNERP, Master Plan, Chapter 4.
2.7.2 Liaison Arrangements
(a) To ensure liaison and coordination between different elements of the emergency response organization, the following arrangements and agreements should be made:
(i) Each provincial ministry and agency with a role in the emergency response to provide a representative to join the PEOC.
(ii) OPG to provide company representative and scientific staff to the PEOC.
(iii) Provincial staff to be deployed to join the Municipal Emergency Operations Centre (EOC).
(iv) DNGS to provide a liaison officer to the Municipal EOC (see (b) below for functions).
(v) A federal liaison group to join the PEOC.
(b) The role of the DNGS liaison officer at the Municipal EOC, paragraph 2.7.2 (a) (iv) will be to act as a link to the station in respect of the following types of issues:
(i) OPG support to the municipalities, e.g. Monitoring & Decontamination Units and Emergency Worker Centres.
(ii) Requests for assistance (e.g., for additional personal monitoring resources, stable iodine tablets, fire or Emergency Medical Services at DNGS etc.).
(iii) Coordination of the evacuation of non-essential station staff, and of the movement of essential staff to and from the site.
(iv) Facilitating the work of the offsite field monitoring teams.
(v) Providing situational updates related to the emergency at the nuclear facility.
(vi) Providing technical briefings to the Municipal EOC staff in order to clarify the context within which the operational situation may be understood.
2.7.3 Joint Traffic Control Centre
A Joint Traffic Control Centre (JTCC) shall be set up and staffed for a DNGS emergency to implement the Joint Traffic Control Plan made under section 1.4, upon notification of either a Partial or Full Activation response by the Province.
2.7.4 Municipal Organization
The Region of Durham shall set up a municipal emergency response organization as prescribed in its Municipal Plan.
2.7.5 Provincial Ministry Offices
The following regional/district/area offices of provincial ministries shall be prepared to respond to the emergency and to provide the necessary assistance to the designated municipalities, as required by the PNERP Master Plan, Annex I, and detailed in the municipal plans, or as directed by their respective ministries:
(a) Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs
(b) Community and Social Services
Toronto Region Office
Central East Region Office
(c) Community Safety and Correctional Services - OPP
Highway Safety Division
Central Region Office
York Durham District Office
Central Region Office, Mississauga
Radiation Protection Service,
(f) Municipal Affairs and Housing
Municipal Service Office – Central Region
(g) Natural Resources
Central Region, MTO
2.7.6 Host Municipalities
(a) Pursuant to subsection 3(4) of the Emergency Management and Civil Protection Act (EMCPA), R.S.O. 1990, c.E.9 the City of Toronto and the City of Peterborough have been designated as host municipalities (see PNERP, Master Plan, Annex A) and as such must address responsibilities for nuclear emergencies in their Municipal Plans (formulated under subsection 3(1) of the EMCPA).
(b) The PNERP Master Plan, Annex I provides details on designated (host) municipality responsibilities, including the appropriate preparations to receive, shelter and care for evacuees.
2.7.7 Support Municipalities
In the event of a declared emergency, the Premier or LGIC may order a municipality to provide support or assistance to the affected, designated municipalities at the time of the emergency (as authorized by sections 7.0.2(4) or 7.0.3 of the EMPCA).
2.8.1 The PEOC shall normally coordinate the emergency management and response organization through the centres in the tier below it (see Figure 2.5). However, if for any reason any of these centres are not functioning or are not responsive, the PEOC may issue directions directly to any element of the emergency response organization.
2.8.2 Likewise, in the absence of contact with the PEOC, these organizations are responsible for taking appropriate actions, according to plans, procedures and the requirements of the situation and, as far as possible, in coordination with other responding organization.
The location of the various local emergency centres and facilities to be established, pursuant to this plan are detailed in the Municipal Plan.
2.10.1 All emergency centres and facilities are linked through landline phone as well as other systems, which also enable facsimile transmission (fax), email and data transfers.
2.10.2 Ontario Power Generation should arrange the establishment of reliable contingency communications between its CEOF and the following centres:
(a) Provincial Emergency Operations Centre (PEOC)
(b) Darlington Nuclear Generating Station (DNGS)
(c) Municipal Emergency Operations Centre (Municipal EOC)
2.10.3 All organizations and agencies involved in responding to a DNGS nuclear emergency should ensure:
(a) Essential telephone lines needed to make outgoing calls during an emergency are covered by the Priority Access for Dialing program (where available).
(b) The availability of backup telecommunications systems e.g. cell phones and satellite phones.
3.1.1 According to responsibilities under the federal legislation (see PNERP, Master Plan paragraph 5.5.1) and regulations and/or under agreement with the provincial government, the Darlington Nuclear Generating Station (DNGS) shall notify the pre-designated contact points (paragraph 3.1.6 below) in provincial and municipal emergency organizations as soon as conditions arise at the facility which require such initial notification under the criteria determined in Table 3.1 and, as incorporated in facility procedures.
3.1.2 DNGS shall complete this initial notification to the provincial contact point within 15 minutes of the requirement for notification being recognized.
3.1.3 The form and content of the initial notification shall be determined by the Chief, Emergency Management Ontario. The notification shall always contain the highest applicable category. In the case of a GENERAL EMERGENCY or ONSITE EMERGENCY notification, the message must state whether an emission is ongoing or if not, give a best estimate of when it is expected to commence and the wind direction at the time of the notification.
3.1.4 Up to four hours after the initial notification, if the assessment of the onsite situation changes to warrant a different category from the one initially notified, DNGS or Ontario Power Generation (OPG) shall immediately make a report of its new assessment to the provincial contact point. Once ongoing reporting by DNGS/OPG to the Scientific Section of the Provincial Emergency Operations Centre (PEOC) is established, there is no longer any requirement for any change in the category to be reported by the nuclear facility staff.
3.1.5 DNGS/OPG cannot terminate or cancel an initial notification once it has been made. Such a notification will automatically lapse when the provincial response to it is formally terminated (paragraph 3.2.3 below).
3.1.6 Contact Points
(a) The Provincial contact point shall be the PEOC.
(b) The following municipal contact points shall be set out in the Municipal Plan (paragraph 1.3.1):
(i) A notification contact point for the receipt of initial notification on a 24 hour/day, 7 day/week basis.
(ii) A municipal emergency response staff person who can be contacted on a 24 hour/day, 7 day/week basis for passage of information and monitoring of the situation, following the initiation of a notification.
3.2.1 The initial provincial response to a notification from DNGS shall depend on the category (and other relevant information) contained in the notification message (see Table 3.1).
3.2.2 Within 15 minutes of the receipt of an initial notification, the PEOC shall decide on the initial response level to be adopted, and inform the municipal contact point. This level will normally be the one linked to the category of the notification received (see Table 3.2) unless another level is judged to be more appropriate.
3.2.3 The provincial response level adopted can be changed to another level, if considered appropriate, by the PEOC. Such a change can include termination of the provincial response. All concerned shall be notified of any such change.
3.2.4 The initial (and any subsequent) response level to be adopted by the municipalities and other organizations shall be communicated by the PEOC (paragraphs 3.2.2 above). The general municipal response for each level is outlined in Table 3.2; the specific response shall be prescribed in the municipal plan.
3.3.1 Provincial Organizations
If the PNERP is to be activated (whether fully or partially), the PEOC shall issue an appropriate notification (including an indication of the level of activation) to its staff as well as to the provincial staff of the Emergency Information Section, and to at least one pre-designated contact point in each of the following jurisdictions and organizations:
(a) Durham Region
(b) Each Provincial-level organization required to respond to the emergency
(c) Host municipalities
(d) Ontario Power Generation (Head Office)
(e) Darlington Nuclear Generating Station
3.3.2 Other Organizations
Each jurisdiction/organization receiving a notification of an Activation Response (either Partial or Full) should issue an appropriate internal notification to its units and individuals who are required to respond. The notification should indicate the level of activation to be adopted.
3.3.3 Notification Procedures and Lists
The PEOC and each jurisdiction/organization required to issue an internal or external notification (section 3.4 below) should prepare a procedure and list of recipients.
3.4.1 Upon adoption of an Activation Response (Partial or Full), external notifications shall be carried out as detailed below. The notification must indicate the level of activation being adopted.
3.4.2 The PEOC shall notify:
(a) The Federal government
(b) The Province of Quebec
(c) The State of New York
(d) Canadian Coast Guard
(e) The State of Ohio
(f) The State of Michigan
(g) Canada News Wire
3.4.3 The Federal government will, in turn, notify the U.S. government and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) under existing agreements and conventions.
1. Any event or condition that reduces the nuclear station’s capability to deal with an emergency onsite, and which persists for longer than the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) allowed time limits.
2. Any event or condition that reduces the nuclear facility’s capability to provide the agreed offsite emergency support, and which is expected to persist for over 8 hours, or actually does so.
3. Natural, toxic, flammable, destructive or other phenomena which have the potential to lead to a minor* break in the physical integrity of the nuclear heat transport system boundary or the moderator system.
4. Unexpected/unplanned activation of the emergency cooling injection system or the containment system (including box-up).
5. Declaration of a Station Emergency, with no potential for offsite effects.
6. Any credible publicly announced threat to, or attempted or actual breach of, the facility’s security that threatens its safe operation.
1. Level 1 or 2 impairment of a special safety system, which persists for more than 4 hours.
2. Reduced ability to :
A. Carry out offsite field monitoring.
B. Provide source term data.
C. Provide required personnel to the offsite emergency response organization.
3A. Equipment failure.
3B. Extreme environmental conditions.
3D. Fire or explosion.
4A. Unexpected/unplanned activation of the ECI system component that does not result in injection.
4B. Unexpected/unplanned activation of the containment system.
4C. Excludes events initiated during testing.
6A. A publicized bomb threat.
6B. A breach or attempted breach of the protected area.
1. A minor* break in the physical integrity of the nuclear heat transport system boundary with no fuel failures (actual or likely).
2. Natural, toxic, flammable, destructive or other phenomena which have the potential to lead to the major* break specified in Item 1 under ONSITE EMERGENCY.
3. Activation of the emergency cooling injection system or the containment system (including box-up) due to a process system upset which is not reportable under any other category.
4. Declaration of a Station Emergency due to an occurrence which has the potential to result in offsite effects.
1. LOCA with or without containment impairment (but no fuel failure)
2. Similar causes as for # 3 under REPORTABLE EVENT
3A. Activation of the ECI system component that results in injection.
3B. Activation of the containment system on high activity or pressure.
(Note: A notification with this category must state whether an emission is ongoing or, if not, give a best estimate of when it is expected to commence)
1. A major* break in the physical integrity of the nuclear heat transport system boundary, the moderator system, or the irradiated (or spent) fuel handling and storage system, with fuel failures* but with a fully intact and functioning containment system.
2. An abnormal emission* of radioactive material to the atmosphere from any non-reactor source.
3. An event or condition which has the potential to lead to a GENERAL EMERGENCY criterion, concurrent with the loss of the ability to detect or control such a development.
4. Hostile action resulting in actual or potential loss of control over significant elements of station systems, but excluding reactor control systems.
1A. LOCA with fuel failures.
1B. Fuelling machine accident.
2A. Spent fuel bay accident.
2B. Darlington TRF Accident.
3A. Loss of all power.
3B. Extreme environmental conditions.
3C. Earthquake Damage.
3D. Fire or explosion.
(Note : A notification with this category must state whether an emission is ongoing or, if not, give a best estimate of when it is expected to commence).
1. Damage to reactor fuel leading to the release of radioactivity from the fuel along with the failure, impairment, or bypass of containment, resulting in an atmospheric emission or, a reasonable expectation of an emission within the next 12 hours.
2. Hostile action resulting in actual or imminent loss of the ability to achieve and maintain the reactor in a cold shutdown state.
1. LOCA with fuel failures and impaired containment.
2. Loss of control room.
*To be defined in (DNGS) station procedures.
1. Provincial Emergency Operations Centre (PEOC) shall notify the municipal contact point(s), Ontario Power Generation (OPG), and others as appropriate, and shall monitor the situation.
2. Scientific staff is consulted, if appropriate.
3. If and when appropriate, PEOC Emergency Information (EI) staff issues news release(s).
Emergency response staff remain in contact with the PEOC, and monitor event.
1. PEOC shall adopt Enhanced Monitoring, and shall so inform the municipal contact point(s), OPG, and any other organizations affected.
2. External notifications to Michigan, New York, Ohio and Quebec are made.
3. PEOC to set up a duty team consisting of operations staff, scientific staff, OPG representative(s), EI staff, and others as required.
4. If and when appropriate, PEOC EI staff issue news release(s).
5. Provincial staff are notified to remain available to report in for duty.
Emergency response staff monitor event, preferably from Municipal EOC.
(No emission occurring)
1. PEOC shall adopt Partial Activation response (for details, see paragraph 3.7.3), and shall initiate the appropriate internal and external notifications (see sections 3.3 and 3.4 respectively), including the municipal contact point and the host communities.
2. PEOC shall be fully staffed. Consideration shall be given to issuing an Emergency Bulletin and/or news release (see Section 4.13 and 4.14).
Ministry EOCs and Joint Traffic Control Centre (JTCC) to be established and appropriately staffed.
1. Issue notification placing municipal emergency response organization on standby.
2. Municipal EOC fully staffed
3. Emergency Information Centre (EIC) to be established.
4. Other emergency centres readied to become operational without undue delay.
(Emission Ongoing or expected within 12 hrs)
PEOC shall notify and require the municipal contact to activate the public alerting system (paragraph 3.5.3).
PEOC shall adopt Full Activation (for details, see section 3.7.4), and shall initiate the appropriate internal and external notifications (see sections 3.3, 3.4, respectively), including the host communities.
PEOC shall issue the appropriate Emergency Bulletin (paragraph 3.6 and 4.13.2).
4. PEOC shall issue operational directives (unless there are good reasons for modifying this response) implementing the following operational measures:
(a) sheltering in the Contiguous Zone
(b) suspension of road and rail traffic through the Contiguous Zone
(c) the clearance of all boaters in Lake Sector D14
5. PEOC shall assess the situation for further action (see section 4.3.4)).
6. PEOC shall issue further Emergency Bulletins, as appropriate (paragraph 4.13.2).
7. PEOC EI section shall issue news releases, as appropriate (section 4.14)
8. JTCC and Ministry EOCs to be established.
1. Initiate public alerting.
2. Issue notification activating municipal emergency response organization
3. Municipal EOCs, EIC and other centres to be activated and operational.
4. Implement operational directives issued by the PEOC.
(Emission ongoing or expected within 12 hrs)
1. PEOC shall notify and ensure that the municipal contact has activated the public alerting system (paragraph 3.5.2).
2. PEOC shall issue the appropriate Emergency Bulletin (Sections 3.6 and paragraph 4.13.2).
3. PEOC shall issue operational directives implementing the following operational measures:
(a) suspension of road, rail and air traffic throughout the Contiguous Zone.
(b) the evacuation of the Contiguous Zone and Lake Sectors D14 through D16 unless there are good reasons for modifying this response.
4. If emission is ongoing or, if evacuations will not be completed prior to emission, issue operational directives implementing the following operational measures:
evacuees to report for radiation monitoring or, if not possible, to evacuate to a destination beyond the PZ and to undertake self-decontamination.
the ingestion of KI pills in the Contiguous Zone (paragraph 4.5.4 (d)).
(c) sheltering in the rest of the Primary Zone. Otherwise, take this action 4 hours (or, at a time deemed appropriate) before the expected time of commencement of the emission.
5. PEOC shall adopt Full Activation (for details, see paragraph 3.7.4), and shall initiate the appropriate internal and external notifications (see sections 3.3 and 3.4 respectively), including the host community(ies).
PEOC shall assess the situation for further action (see paragraph 4.5.4).
PEOC shall issue further emergency bulletins, as appropriate (paragraph 4.13.2)
PEOC EI section shall issue news releases, as appropriate (section 4.14).
9. Ministry EOCs and JTCC to be established.
1. Initiate public alerting.
2. Issue notification activating municipal emergency response organization.
3. Municipal EOC, EIC and other centres activated and fully staffed.
4. Implement operational directives issued by the PEOC.
TABLE 3.2 - INITIAL PROVINCIAL AND MUNICIPAL RESPONSE
3.4.4 Other agencies/organizations shall be notified by the following:
(a) Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs shall notify:
Dairy Farmers of Ontario
(b) Ministry of Community and Social Services shall notify:
Red Cross, Ontario Zone
(c) Ministry of Natural Resources shall notify:
Central Lake Ontario Conservation Office
Toronto and Region Conservation office
(d) The PEOC shall notify:
(i) Canadian Coast Guard
(ii) National Transportation Agency - Emergency Alert
(iii) Air Traffic Control
(iv) CN Rail
(v) CP Rail
(vi) GO Transit
(vii) VIA Rail
(e) The PEOC shall notify:
(i) Bell Canada
(ii) Wireless phone providers
(f) The Canadian Coast Guard will notify the US Coast Guard under agreed protocols.
(g) Municipal Plans shall provide for the following external notifications:
(i) Appropriate School Boards
(ii) Emergency Medical Services
(iii) Local utilities (Hydro, Gas, Water)
(iv) Local branches of voluntary organizations
3.5 Public Alerting
3.5.1 Public alerting systems developed under this PNERP shall conform to the following principles:
- (a) The Region of Durham, as the designated (Primary Zone) municipality (see PNERP Master Plan, Annex A) shall make provisions, in its nuclear emergency plan, for a public alerting system, which shall ensure that the Primary Zone population that may be required to undertake the initial protective measures of sheltering, evacuation, and/or ingestion of KI can be alerted within 15 minutes of initiation.
- B }The Municipal Plan shall detail how this requirement will be met and, pursuant to Section 5 of the EMCPA, plans of lower-tier municipalities whose populations reside within the required alerting area, shall conform to the Municipal Plan.
- The nuclear emergency response plans of the Region of Durham and the Province shall include provisions to coordinate the timing of public alerting, public direction and emergency information. This will ensure that the population will have timely and accurate information on what protective measures to take once they have been alerted of an emergency.
- The Region of Durham shall undertake an initial evaluation of any new system to ensure that the requirements under this policy have been met. Further, they shall integrate regular testing of existing public alerting systems, as a component of their standard exercise program.
3.5.2 The public alerting system for a DNGS emergency shall, in addition to adhering to the principles in paragraph 3.5.1 above, meet the following requirements:
(a) Ontario Power Generation (OPG) shall provide the resources and assistance to the Region of Durham to enable them to establish and maintain a public alerting system. The public alerting system selected must be subject to consultation amongst the province, OPG, the designated municipality and their lower-tier municipalities.
(b) The public alerting system specifications below reflect the Contiguous Zone’s close proximity to the potential hazard, relative to the remainder of the Primary Zone.
(c) The public alerting system in the Contiguous Zone (0-3 km) must provide, within 15 minutes of initiation, warning to practically 100%3 of the people in the Contiguous Zone at that time, whether they be indoors or outdoors, and irrespective of the time of day or year.
(d) A public alerting system shall be installed in the remainder of the Primary Zone (3-10 km) that will provide, within 15 minutes of initiation, warning on an area-wide basis4 to the population in all of the response sectors within that part of the Primary Zone.
(e) Where the public alerting area includes more than one municipality, the selected system(s) shall be compatible or ideally, integrated in order to ensure consistency in timing, type of signal and other key implementation specifications.
(f) Such a public alerting system, coupled together with emergency bulletins, will ensure that the population within the Primary Zone will be notified in an effective and timely manner.
(a) In case of a GENERAL EMERGENCY notification from DNGS stating that an emission is ongoing or imminent, the municipal contact point should immediately initiate the public alerting system without reference to any other authority.
(b) In all other cases, the decision as to when the public alerting system is to be initiated will be made by the PEOC, who will then issue the necessary instructions to the designated municipalities.
3.6.1 Whenever the public alerting system is initiated, the PEOC will issue an Emergency Bulletin to the broadcast media. The bulletin will contain specific instructions on what actions the public should take and should be continuously repeated for an adequate period of time.
3.6.2 Marine Notification and Public Direction
(a) The PEOC shall notify the Canadian Coast Guard whenever the PEOC receives a (Partial and Full Activation) notification under this plan (paragraph 3.4.4 (d) above) and they, in turn, should notify the U.S. Coast Guard.
(b) In the case of a Full Activation response, the Canadian Coast Guard should broadcast an emergency message through their radio stations to marine craft on the marine radio channel. The message will notify all marine craft of the emergency and direct them to remain clear of the Primary Zone.
(c) The Municipal Plan will detail how the Region of Durham’s Police Marine Unit will assist in notifying and evacuating marine craft that do not have radios on board.
3.7.1 All jurisdictions and organizations identified in this Plan and which receive a notification of the activation of that plan should immediately activate their own plans for dealing with a DNGS emergency. These plans should be fully or partially activated as indicated in the notification received.
3.7.2 Table 3.2 outlines the immediate provincial and municipal response actions to be undertaken for each response level.
3.7.3 Partial Activation
(a) Emergency plans are partially activated when it is anticipated that protective and/or operational measures (other than monitoring and assessment of the situation) are not likely to be immediately required.
(b) When the PNERP and other emergency plans are partially activated, the following actions shall be provided for in plans and procedures:
(i) Activation and full staffing of the PEOC and the Municipal EOC so as to monitor and assess the situation on a continuous basis.
(ii) Activation of the Ministry EOCs and Joint Traffic Control Centre and staffing as appropriate to the situation.
(iii) Activation of the Emergency Information Centre (EIC) with staffing at an appropriate level. Provincial staff to be dispatched, as appropriate.
(iv) All emergency response personnel not immediately required should be placed on standby. This status should ensure that they can be quickly contacted when needed to report to their duty stations.
(v) Other emergency centres should be readied to a level where they can become fully operational without undue delay, when required. Specific levels shall be prescribed in the municipal plans.
3.7.4 Full Activation
(a) A Full Activation response will be adopted by the PEOC when it is expected that protective and/or operational measures to deal with the emergency are immediately necessary or, will be necessary in 36 hours, or less.
(b) Major organization plans under this PNERP (municipal, nuclear facility, ministry) should provide for the following actions upon adoption of a Full Activation response:
(i) All emergency operations centres, emergency information centres, reception centres, evacuee centres, emergency workers centres and monitoring and decontamination units to be fully staffed and operational.
(ii) All emergency response personnel from (i) above to immediately report to their places of duty.
(iii) The field elements under the Scientific Section’s monitoring groups to be placed on standby.
3.7.5 Radiation (Assurance and General Province-wide) Monitoring Plan 5
(a) Upon adoption of either Partial or Full Activation, the Radiation Monitoring Plan should be partially activated (paragraph 3.7.3 above).
(b) The Radiation Monitoring Plan should be fully activated when it appears likely that radioactive contamination will occur in Ontario or some part thereof. Such activation should be done early enough to enable some baseline data to be accumulated before the contamination occurs.
(c) The decision to fully activate the Radiation Monitoring Plan will be made by the PEOC.
3.7.6 Radiation Health Response Plan (RHRP)3
(a) The MOHLTC issues the RHRP as an organizational plan under the PNERP.
(b) The RHRP establishes the roles and responsibilities, and the operational concepts and response principles for coordinating the provincial response of health organizations during a nuclear emergency.
(c) The RHRP will be fully activated through the MOHLTC EOC when it seems likely that the incident may result in high radiation exposures to some persons.
3.7.7 Liquid Emission Response Plan6
(a) A liquid emission is a waterborne release from a nuclear facility resulting in discharges with above normal levels of radioactivity.
(b) The main radiation exposure pathway for a liquid emission from DNGS (normally containing tritium) is through contamination of the water supply, with the resulting hazard being the subsequent ingestion of such contaminated water.
(c) Because of the limited hazard posed by a liquid emission, it is dealt with differently from an atmospheric emission of radioactivity, through the Provincial Liquid Emission Response Plan (PLERP), an organizational plan under the PNERP. It prescribes the organization, operating procedures, linkages, notification criteria response measures, criteria for their application, etc. for undertaking a provincial response to a liquid emission
(d) A liquid emission response undertaken pursuant to the PLERP, may shift to a PNERP response should events escalate to a magnitude where it is deemed appropriate.
e) Further, if the PEOC is functioning as a result of the activation of the PNERP, any liquid emission from DNGS will be dealt with under the PNERP, irrespective of whether the original activation of the PEOC was for a DNGS or any other nuclear emergency.
4.1.1 Operational response activities depend on the notification category received from DNGS:
(a) Upon receiving notification of a Reportable Event, the Provincial Emergency Operations Centre (PEOC) will monitor the situation as Routine Monitoring.
(b) Upon receiving notification of an Abnormal Incident, the PEOC will adopt Enhanced Monitoring.
No activation response is required for the above two notification categories unless an escalation of the emergency occurs.
4.1.2 This chapter deals with emergency response operations for an accident at DNGS which results in, or has the potential to result in, an emission of radioactive material to the atmosphere, and therefore a Partial or Full Activation response.
4.1.3 An outline of the operational response for a DNGS emergency is given in Figures 4.1 (Onsite Emergency Notification) and 4.2 (General Emergency Notification) and an overview of the operational actions required for Activation (Partial and Full) is given in sections 4.3 and 4.5 below.
4.1.4 Principles of other operational response measures are provided in section 4.4 and in sections 4.6 through 4.14.
4.2.1 The PEOC receives notification of an emergency from the DNGS.
4.2.2 The PEOC notifies the municipal and other contact points and passes on the initial provincial response, based on the notification category received.
4.2.3 If an Onsite Emergency notification is received, the response will be either:
(a) Partial Activation for a Delayed Emission (expected in more than 12 hours); or
(b) Full Activation for an Ongoing/Imminent Emission (either ongoing or expected in 12 hours or less) as a result of a non-reactor emergency.
4.2.4 If a General Emergency notification is received, the response adopted will be Full Activation (public alerting will be initiated) as the (reactor) emission, by definition, will either be ongoing or expected within 12 hours or less.
4.2.5 In the event of a Full Activation, the PEOC will advise government whether declaration of a provincial emergency is warranted.
4.2.6 The initial actions to be undertaken depend on whether the response initiated is Partial Activation (section 4.3) or Full Activation (section 4.5 below).
The most probable scenario for an accident at the DNGS, which could result in the partial activation of this plan, would include the holdup within the station containment system of any radioactive material released from damaged fuel. This would delay the emission of radioactivity to the environment (for a typical accident, see paragraph 2.2.2).
4.3.2 The general sequence of actions required to be taken by the PEOC for a Partial Activation response is likely to be as follows:
(a) Notification of the emergency management organization and set up and full staffing of emergency operations centres (paragraph 3.7.3).
(b) Technical assessments of the accident situation and its projected effects as described in paragraph 4.3.3 below.
(c) Decisions on precautionary and protective measures and implementation as described in paragraph 4.3.4 below.
4.3.3 Technical Assessments
The Scientific Section of the PEOC shall undertake the following assessments for input into the Command Section decision making process:
(a) The Accident and its Prognosis
As soon as possible an evaluation shall be made, by the Scientific Section’s Nuclear Incident Group, of the initiating accident/event and the status of relevant station systems. Based on this, an assessment shall then be made of the likely development of the situation in respect of both positive and negative outcomes. This shall continue as an ongoing process.
(b) Repressurization Time
Another ongoing assessment process shall deal with the progress of repressurization of the station vacuum structure, leading to continually updated forecasts of the times at which its pressure will reach, firstly, the minimum level required for the Filtered Air Discharge System (FADS) operation and, secondly, the level at which FADS operation becomes necessary.
(c) Venting Data and Projections
Venting data will be analyzed and projections made to allow venting decision-making to be carried out by the PEOC and stakeholders.
(d) Evacuation Distance
A technical projection is required of the maximum distance from the nuclear station at which the lower Protective Action Level (PAL) (see PNERP Master Plan, Annex E) for evacuation is likely to be reached during the anticipated duration of the emission. (Allowance should be made for the effects of early venting, if in fact it will be possible).
(e) Other Protective Measures
Technical projections will also be required for the maximum distance from the station at which the PALs for the other protective measures (sheltering, KI) are likely to be reached.
4.3.4 Implementation of Protective Measures
(a) The PEOC will upgrade to a Full Activation response prior to directing the implementation of protective measures and/or at least 36 hours prior to the emission time, if it is known.
(b) Assessment of Protective Measures
The technical assessment of the situation will produce a projection of the maximum distance from DNGS at which the lower PAL for evacuation, sheltering and KI ingestion is likely to be reached during the anticipated duration of the emission. Evaluating this, and taking into account operational and public policy considerations, a preliminary assessment shall be prepared regarding the need to implement these measures and if needed, the ring of response sectors out to which these measure should take place.
This technical assessment and the assessment of the protective measure area shall be continually updated and, as soon as a reasonably certain picture of the evacuation (and other protective measures) distance is achieved, the PEOC, through the Command Section, shall provide directions, regarding the operational directives (or, in the event of a declared emergency, shall advise that such orders have been made) to the designated municipalities, host and support municipalities and the nuclear facility.
(c) Emergency Bulletins – Protective Measures
Once all relevant stakeholders have been informed and implementation of the necessary actions may begin, the PEOC shall issue an Emergency Bulletin informing the affected public of the timing and extent of the expected emission as well as the timing and extent of the protective actions that will likely be required.
If the emission is not expected for 36 hours, or more, at the time that the initial Emergency Bulletin is issued, that bulletin should include the following information:
(i) date/time of expected emission
(ii) sectors (by geographical description) which may be affected
(iii) if/when precautionary and protective measures will be ordered and what those measures are for each affected sector/area (see 4.3.4 (d) and (e)).
(iv) public inquiry phone number(s)
(v) evacuation instructions (see section 4.7 below)
As successive Emergency Bulletins are issued, as much additional information as possible should be provided which may serve to encourage those who can leave early, to make that decision to evacuate.
While the Emergency Bulletins issued 36 hours or more before an emission is expected to occur will be informative and permissive, the Emergency Bulletins issued less than 36 hours before the expected emission time will be increasingly directive – issuing actual operational directives (or, in the event of a declared emergency, advising that such orders have been made) for evacuations.
The PEOC should upgrade to a Full Activation response if it is known that an emission is expected in 36 hours, or less.
(d) Emergency Bulletins - Sheltering
The need for future sheltering as a protective measure should be broadcast through the Emergency Bulletin as soon as that need is identified. The timing to actually issue an operational directive for sheltering (or, in the event of a declared emergency, advise that such orders have been made) shall be ultimately decided by the PEOC (as a general guidance, however, the Emergency Bulletin to direct this protective measure should be issued at least 4 hours prior to the expected emission time) following escalation to a Full Activation response.
(e) Precautionary Measures
The PEOC shall consider the advisability of issuing operational directives (or, in the event of a declared emergency, advising that such orders have been made) for any or all of the following precautionary measures in the Primary Zone (or part thereof) and adjacent areas. Consideration shall also be given to the most suitable timing for the measures (in the case of a delayed emission it may be appropriate to delay the application of some of them), and issue the necessary bulletin(s) and directions for their implementation. These measures are:
(i) Closing of beaches, recreation areas, etc.
(ii) Closing of workplaces and schools
(iii) Suspension of admissions of non-critical patients in hospitals
(iv) Entry control (section 4.6)
(v) Clearing the milk storage of dairy farms
(vi) Banning consumption of any item of food or water that may have been exposed outdoors
(vii) Banning consumption and export of locally produced milk, meat, produce, milk-and meat-producing animals
(viii) Removing milk- and meat-producing animals from outside pasture and exposed water sources.
4.4.1 The holdup within the station containment structure (e.g. vacuum building) of any radioactive material released from damaged fuel would create the possibility of venting such contained radioactivity in a controlled manner and in a safe direction, i.e., over the lake (refer to PNERP Master Plan, Annex G) .
4.4.2 DNGS/OPG shall include, in each hourly report to the PEOC, an estimate of the time at which the vacuum building pressure would reach the minimum level at which the emergency filtered air discharge system (EFADS) can be operated.
4.4.3 The time interval between the occurrence of the accident and containment pressure reaching this minimum level will depend on the condition and behaviour of the containment system. With no impairment to containment, this time interval is expected to be about 7 days (an impaired containment could significantly reduce that time).
4.4.4 The PEOC should consider, in consultation with OPG, the CNSC and Region of Durham, whether venting according to the considerations in the PNERP Master Plan, Annex G, would be feasible and/or advisable. Detailed procedures for such decision-making should be developed in consultation with the above agencies and incorporated in the PEOC procedures for the Scientific, Operations and Command Sections, as appropriate.
4.4.5 Ground Monitoring
To detect any “blow back”7 of radioactivity towards land during venting, ground monitoring teams from DNGS will complete surveys 20 km on either side of the plant, following the shoreline. If any radioactivity which could be due to a “blow back” is detected, it shall be immediately reported by DNGS/OPG to the PEOC.
4.5.1 A Full Activation response will be considered or initiated under the following circumstances:
(a) Automatically upon receipt of a General Emergency notification
(b) Automatically upon receipt of an Onsite emergency notification where an emission is ongoing or imminent.
(c) At a later stage of an emergency due to a sudden deterioration
(d) The repressurization time has reached 36 hours or, a time as determined by the PEOC as appropriate.
4.5.2 For a situation such as paragraph 4.5.1 (a) & (b) there will be an urgent need to take protective measures for the public likely to be affected. It is unlikely that there will be time to assemble adequate information and carry out a detailed assessment. Action shall be taken based on the best information readily available, and according to the guidelines given below:
Sequence of Action
(a) If the PEOC receives an initial notification from DNGS that an emission is either ongoing or imminent, (and time is not available for an initial scientific assessment) the Duty Operations Chief shall take the following immediate actions:
(i) Initiate a Full Activation provincial response
(ii) Direct public alerting to be initiated and inform the designated municipalities of the operational directives being issued (or, in the event of a declared emergency advise of such orders being made) as per (iii) below.
(iii) Issue the relevant Emergency Bulletin to the broadcast media:
• If the notification category is Onsite Emergency, issue operational directive for sheltering of the Contiguous Zone and evacuation of Lake Sector D14.
• If the notification category is General Emergency, issue operational directive for evacuation of the Contiguous Zone and all Lake Sectors and, sheltering of the rest of the Primary Zone.
(iv) As soon as the Scientific Section is assembled, it shall undertake a rapid technical assessment to determine what further protective measures are required (paragraph 4.5.3 below).
(v) Technical assessments shall be repeated on a continuous basis and further operational directives will be issued (or, in the event of a declared emergency, it shall be advised that such orders have been made) as appropriate.
(b) If the Full Activation response is initiated as a result of an escalation of an event in progress, the sequence of action will be as per paragraph 4.5.2 (a) with the exception being that the operational directives being issued (or, in the event of a declared emergency, advice that such orders have been made) will be based on the ongoing technical assessments of the Scientific Section.
4.5.3 Technical Assessments
(a) Main Issues to be Assessed
The main issues arising at the commencement of this scenario are:
(i) If an emission is not occurring, when is it likely to commence?
(ii) Which response sectors are likely to be affected by the ongoing or imminent emission, and thus may require the application of immediate protective measures?
The Scientific Section procedures shall detail how these assessments will be made.
(b) Condition of Station Systems
Table 4.3 gives four main categories for the condition of station systems along with some examples of each.
Based on the information available, the Scientific Section shall make the following assessments:
(i) Which set of baseline protective measures in Table 4.3 best matches the current conditions.
(ii) Whether current meteorological conditions warrant any change to the distance out to which protective measures are advised under Table 4.3.
(iii) Which are the sectors likely to be affected by the emission.
(iv) Table 4.3 Guidelines provide a baseline for making appropriate judgements. However, if time and adequate information are not available, they may be used as default measures.
(c) Variation in Conditions
In an actual event the estimate of station conditions may not conform exactly to the various sets of conditions given in Table 4.3. In such a case the baseline/default protective measures area, given in the table, may be appropriately modified.
(d) Exposure Levels
The Scientific Section shall make an assessment as to whether the dose in any sector(s) is likely to require the activation of the Radiation Health Response Plan (paragraph 4.5.6 below).
(e) Subsequent Technical Assessments
As more data and projections become available, the Scientific Section shall continuously update the assessments made in order to establish whether any additional protective measures are required.
As soon as feasible, the Scientific Section shall make a projection of the maximum distance from the nuclear station at which the lower Protective Action Levels (PALs) for evacuation, sheltering and thyroid blocking are likely to be reached during the anticipated remaining duration of the emission. This assessment will be continually updated, and will be used to decide on additional protective measures (see paragraph 4.5.4 (c) below).
4.5.4 Immediate Protective Measures
(i) The Command Section, PEOC will consider the implementation of immediate precautionary and protective measures and the appropriate operational directives (or, in the event of a declared emergency, advice of such order(s)) will be communicated via Emergency Bulletin.
(ii) Command decisions taken will be based on advice from the Scientific (paragraph 4.5.3 above) as well as operational and public policy consideration.
Some guidance on the implementation of these measures is given below.
(b) Precautionary Measures
See paragraph 4.3.4 (e).
(c) Evacuation and Personal Monitoring and Decontamination
(i) Where evacuations are being undertaken during an emission, the first priority shall be to leave the affected area as quickly as possible. If conditions permit, evacuees will be advised (via Emergency Bulletin) to go to a facility for monitoring and decontamination. However, if that is not possible, evacuees should be advised to go to a destination of their own choice and once there, decontaminate themselves by bagging their old clothes, showering, washing their hair, and putting on a fresh change of clothes.
(ii) Details for decontamination shall be provided through the Emergency Bulletins as will the location of facilities where evacuees may go for follow-up assurance monitoring for radioactive contamination.
(d) Thyroid Blocking
(i) The decision to issue an operational directive for thyroid blocking will be made by the MOHLTC, in coordination with the PEOC.
(ii) Details regarding thyroid blocking are provided in the MOHLTC’s Radiation Health Response Plan.
(i) In the case of an imminent emission, the operational directive to shelter (or, in the event of a declared emergency, advice that such orders have been made) shall be issued via an Emergency Bulletin at least 4 hours before the emission is expected to commence.
(ii) In the case of an ongoing emission, all sectors adjacent to sectors requiring evacuation should be advised via operational directive to shelter (or, in the event of a declared emergency, advise that such orders have been made).
BASELINE / DEFAULT PROTECTIVE MEASURES
Issue Immediate Operational Directives
A. Intermediate to severe core damage with an accompanying loss of the containment function.
1. Failure of reactor shutdown, or
2. LOCA and failure of ECI, or
3. LOCA causing early flow stagnation in a core pass
1. Large hole in the containment envelope (e.g., airlock doors open, multiple airlock seal failures), or
2. An emission pathway bypassing containment.
1. Evacuation of the Contiguous Zone, all other Primary Zone sectors likely to be affected by the emission, and the area beyond the Primary Zone likely to be affected by the emission up to a distance of 20 km from the reactor.
2. Thyroid Blocking: All evacuees from the Primary Zone to ingest a KI dose.
3. Personal Monitoring: All evacuees from the Primary Zone to proceed to a facility for personal monitoring or to self-decontaminate at destination.
4. Sheltering: All sectors likely to be affected by the emission, which are not immediately evacuating, to shelter. Also, all sectors/areas adjacent (in the same ring) to sectors/areas being evacuated should shelter.
B. Intermediate level of core damage and a loss of the filtered pathway.
1. LOCA and failure of ECI, or
2. LOCA and failure of emergency coolant recovery
1. Containment envelope impairment resulting in effective loss of pressure control, and/or
2. Impairment of the FADS, including a reduction in filter efficiency.
1. Evacuation of the Contiguous Zone and all other Primary Zone sectors likely to be affected by the emission.
2. Thyroid Blocking: All evacuees to ingest a KI dose.
3. Personal Monitoring: All evacuees to proceed to a facility for personal monitoring (ongoing emission only) or to self-decontaminate at destination.
4. Sheltering: All sectors likely to be affected by the emission, which are not immediately evacuating, to shelter. Also, all sectors adjacent (in the same ring ) to those being evacuated should shelter.
C. Intermediate to severe fuel damage with containment envelope impairment leading to an early emission through the FADS.
1. LOCA causing flow stagnation in a core pass, or
2. LOCA and failure of ECI, or
3. LOCA and failure of emergency coolant recovery, or
4. End-fitting or other failure and fuel ejection from a channel, or
5. LOCA in fuelling machine
Loss of containment pressure control requiring early activation of the FADS.
1. Evacuation of the Contiguous Zone and all sectors in the Middle Ring likely to be affected by the emission.
2. Personal Monitoring: All evacuees to proceed to a facility for personal monitoring (ongoing emission only) or to self-decontaminate at destination.
3. Sheltering: All sectors in the Middle Ring adjacent to those being evacuated should shelter. Sectors beyond this zone likely to be affected by the emission to also shelter.
D. All other events or conditions likely to lead to an emission.
1. Spent fuel bay accident.
2. TRF accident.
1. Sheltering the Contiguous Zone and evacuate Lake Sector D14.
TABLE 4.3 - IMMEDIATE PROTECTIVE MEASURES - GUIDELINES
Note : The zones mentioned in the table include lake sectors(see paragraph 2.5.1).
(For application, see paragraph 4.5.3 )
4.5.5 Protective Measures at Time of Emission
(a) Continuous reassessments up to and including the time that an emission occurs shall be carried out to confirm or revise the areas requiring protective measures.
(b) During the emission, the situation and projections shall be continually reassessed to see if any additional protective measures are necessary.
4.5.6 Radiation Health Response Plan
If it is estimated that the radiation dose in any sector is likely to be significant, as determined by the Scientific Section, the appropriate provisions of the Radiation Health Response Plan shall be implemented by the MOHLTC.
4.5.7 Subsequent Measures
Technical and operational assessments shall be repeated on a continuous basis and additional protective, precautionary and operational measures shall be considered by the PEOC, and implemented as appropriate via operational directive (or, in the event of a declared emergency, shall advise that such orders have been made). (See sections 4.6 – 4.13 for guidance).
4.6.1 Management of the main traffic routes shall be coordinated by the PEOC as follows:
(a) In the case of marine, air and rail, through the relevant coordinating agency in the PEOC (federal liaison, MTO, OPP)
(b) In the case of road traffic, by the Joint Traffic Control Centre (JTCC) via the MCSCS representative in the PEOC.
4.6.2 In the event of an ongoing emission or one that is imminent, the PEOC should consider the following entry control measures and notify the proper authority(ies) for implementation as appropriate:
(a) Suspension of through traffic on main road and rail routes going through the Primary Zone (Hwy. 401, Hwy. 2, the CN and CP lines).
(b) Suspension of marine traffic in the Primary Zone area (D14-D16) of Lake Ontario.
(c) Aircraft should be kept clear of the Primary Zone.
4.6.3 Joint Traffic Control Plan
(a) This plan shall include provisions for preventing traffic on the main evacuation routes from entering the Primary Zone whenever Stage 2 of the plan is put into effect.
(b) Such through traffic shall be diverted around the Primary Zone via a pre-designated diversion route.
(c) Entry to emergency workers (who have tasks in the zone) shall be permitted on these routes.
(d) If main traffic routes are likely to remain closed for an extended period, the Joint Traffic Control Centre, under the guidance of the PEOC, shall make alternative routing arrangements. Prior planning for this eventuality will minimize the disruption created by such closures.
4.6.4 As Part of Protective Measures
(a) Lake Sectors
Whenever it is likely that a radioactive emission will take place as the result of an accident/event at DNGS, operational directives should be issued to clear Response Sectors D14 through D16 of boats, (or, in the event of a declared emergency, advise that such orders have been made) and entry control imposed on them through the Canadian Coast Guard and the marine unit of the Durham Regional Police Service.
(b) Evacuated Sectors
Full entry control should be implemented for sectors that have been evacuated. However, access will be allowed to emergency workers who have tasks to perform in these sectors. This entry control shall be the responsibility of the appropriate police service, under the Joint Traffic Control Plan.
(c) Sheltered Sectors
Entry control will be advised for sectors undergoing sheltering.
4.7.1 General Principles
(i) Evacuation is one of the protective measures considered by the PEOC in a nuclear emergency.
(ii) The purpose of an evacuation is to prevent or minimize the exposure of members of the public to the effects of radiation.
(iii) All routes will be utilized to evacuate the Primary Zone.
(iv) Shadow evacuations may occur spontaneously in areas contiguous to the Primary Zone and thus contribute to the evacuation time for the Primary Zone.
(i) In the event of a delayed emission, evacuees are not expected to be contaminated and will therefore not require monitoring and/or decontamination.
(ii) In the event of an ongoing or imminent emission, evacuees exposed to the radioactive emission can be expected to have varying levels of contamination.
(iii) Contamination, where found, would be in the form of loose particulate on people, their belongings and vehicles.
(iv) Internal contamination may be present in individuals exposed to a radioactive emission.
(v) Monitoring and Decontamination facilities will be required for those evacuees who will not be able to self-decontaminate as well as for those who desire assurance monitoring.
(i) During a nuclear emergency, traffic density on major routes and highways will be significantly increased and therefore, travel time in all directions will be longer than normal.
(ii) Traffic control will be required to ensure that evacuations can proceed as smoothly as possible.
(d) Family Reunification
(i) Families will want to reunite and evacuate together, as far as possible.
(ii) The ability for families to reunite will depend on the time of day at the onset of the emergency and on the urgency for evacuations to proceed (i.e. timing of the emission).
(iii) Factors affecting family reunification include workplace location, school children, residents of hospitals, nursing homes or other institutions, etc.
(e) Mass Care
(i) The majority of evacuees will make their own arrangements for care and lodging. Mass care arrangements will be required for those evacuees without such resources.
(ii) Assurances will be required that evacuees requiring either publicly or privately provided accommodation, are not contaminated.
4.7.2 Directing Evacuations
(a) Evacuations will be directed by Response Sector or groups of sectors, detailing the boundaries of the evacuation area.
(b) Evacuees who may have been exposed to an emission will be directed either to proceed to a Monitoring and Decontamination Unit (MDU) or to self-decontaminate upon reaching their destination. Information on locations for monitoring shall be provided at the time of the emergency.
(c) Evacuees who are not at risk of being contaminated will be instructed to leave the Primary Zone and will not be directed to an MDU or to self-decontaminate.
(d) Evacuees will be permitted to evacuate in the direction and to the destination of their choosing, subject to restrictions (due to weather, traffic conditions etc.) announced by the PEOC through the Emergency Bulletins.
(e) The smooth and expeditious movement of evacuee traffic is the responsibility of the traffic control organization set up under the Joint Traffic Control Plan.
(f) The Joint Traffic Control Centre will monitor the evacuating traffic and inform the PEOC of any issues impacting the evacuation.
4.7.3 Evacuation Arrangements
(a) The Region of Durham’s Municipal Plan shall include arrangements for mass evacuation transportation and/ or medical transfers.
(b) Medical assistance required during an evacuation is the responsibility of the emergency medical services and hospitals under municipal arrangements or mutual aid agreements and should be detailed in the Municipal Plan.
(c) The Municipal Plans of designated (Primary Zone and Host) municipalities, shall include details for the reception and care of evacuees.
(d) OPG will provide details regarding the monitoring and decontamination of evacuees in its emergency plan and associated procedures (see 4.7.5).
(e) Emergency plans of the schools in the Primary Zone should provide for the movement of staff and students to pre-arranged host schools and, if necessary, to Monitoring and Decontamination Units for prior monitoring and decontamination. Evacuated students are the responsibility of their school staff until collected from the host school by their guardians/parents.
(f) Emergency plans of hospitals, nursing homes, and other institutions in the Primary Zone should include provisions for the transfer of staff/residents/patients to an appropriate facility outside the Primary Zone, with which prior arrangements have been made. Provisions should also be made to take staff/residents/patients to Monitoring and Decontamination Units, if necessary.
As it may not be possible or desirable to evacuate some of these persons, special arrangements shall be made for the care of staff/residents/patients remaining behind, as identified in the Municipal Plans.
4.7.4 Darlington Nuclear Generating Station (DNGS) - Evacuation
DNGS prepares its own evacuation plans for non-essential onsite personnel. During an emergency, the actual evacuation of onsite personnel will be carried out in consultation with the PEOC. Where time permits without compromising the safety of station staff (i.e. delayed or imminent emission), the timing/sequence of such onsite evacuations will be agreed to in advance with the PEOC.
4.7.5 Monitoring and Decontamination
(a) OPG will resource five Monitoring and Decontamination Units (MDUs) as follows:
(i) Three MDUs will be located at fixed sites.
(ii) Two MDUs will be mobile facilities, stored in trailers at an OPG facility and transportable, when required, to locations which have been pre-designated.
(b) Multiple sites which can host the mobile MDUs will be pre-designated to ensure the availability of infrastructure and amenities to support their operation.
(c) Fixed sites as well as the pre-designated sites for mobile units will be selected so as to provide, as far as possible, monitoring and decontamination options for all directions surrounding the Primary Zone.
(d) Fixed and mobile MDUs will provide both assurance monitoring, for those who have undertaken self-decontamination, as well as monitoring and decontamination for those evacuees who either require or desire it upon evacuating the Primary Zone.
(e) Mobile MDUs can also deployed to support fixed MDUs if additional capacity is required at those locations.
(f) The MOHLTC will develop arrangements, in coordination with OPG, hospitals, designated municipalities and their public health units, to track evacuees for the purposes of contamination assessments (internal and external) and to provide follow up with those affected.
4.8.1 It is the responsibility of OPG to procure adequate quantities of KI pills for the Primary Zone population (PNERP Master Plan, Appendix 13 to Annex I).
4.8.2 Designated municipalities shall detail in their plans the means by which they will facilitate:
(a) Availability of KI pills for Primary Zone institutions and for emergency centres (Emergency Worker, Reception and Evacuee Centres and MDUs).
(b) Availability of KI pills for any members of the Primary Zone population who may wish to possess a supply.
4.8.3 Other operational responsibilities regarding Thyroid Blocking (stocking, distribution and administration) are prescribed in the Radiation Health Response Plan, as prepared by MOHLTC.
4.8.4 The decision to implement the administration of KI will be taken by the Chief Medical Officer of Health.
4.9.1 A Joint Traffic Control Plan shall be developed for the Primary Zone as well as the main roads entering it. During an emergency, the Joint Traffic Control Centre (JTCC) (paragraph 2.6.3) shall be responsible for implementing the Joint Traffic Control Plan (section 1.5).
4.9.2 The traffic control plan shall be designed to allow implementation in three incremental stages:
(a) Stage 1. Automatically initiated as soon as the traffic control plan is activated. The aim in this stage shall be to keep traffic flowing smoothly on the main evacuation routes and, to ensure that these routes remain open.
(b) Stage 2. Initiated when it appears likely that the emergency may require evacuations or, when spontaneous evacuations begin to occur. Traffic shall be prevented from entering the Primary Zone on the main evacuation routes and shall instead be diverted around it (local traffic can still enter the Primary Zone on other routes). However, access should be allowed to emergency workers who have tasks to perform in the Primary Zone. Stage 1 measures will continue.
(c) Stage 3. Initiated when it appears that particular sectors are likely to be evacuated. Additional resources shall be deployed to ensure that evacuations proceed smoothly beyond the Primary Zone boundary. Stages 1 and 2 measures will continue.
4.9.3 The timing and order of sector evacuations will be determined by the PEOC, in coordination with the JTCC.
4.9.4 The traffic control plan shall provide, where applicable, for the priority evacuation of any Response Sector(s) (paragraph 4.6.4), if and when ordered.
4.9.5 Operational directives implementing evacuations (or emergency orders issued in the event of a declared emergency) will be accompanied by emergency bulletins issued by the PEOC.
4.10.1 Radiation monitoring surveys shall be carried out, under the auspices of the Scientific Section of the PEOC, in order to determine the following information:
(b) Exposure rates and contamination levels
(c) Identification of radionuclides
(d) Appropriate sampling locations
4.10.2 Monitoring and data analysis details shall be provided in the operating procedures of the Scientific Section and the groups operating under it (Nuclear Incident, Environmental Radiation Monitoring, Assurance Monitoring, and General Province-Wide Monitoring Groups).
4.10.3 Field Monitoring Resources
Upon request from the PEOC’s Scientific Section, Environmental Radiation Monitoring Group, Health Canada will arrange aerial monitoring to determine the path of the radioactive plume and the location of ground contamination. This will support ground monitoring positioning and deployment.
4.10.4 Nuclear Facility Off-Site Monitoring
(a) DNGS/OPG teams will provide off-site monitoring resulting from the airborne release of radioactive materials:
(i) Gamma dose rate measurements and air and ground samples at the near boundary (1 km), far boundary (3 km) and PZ boundary (10 km) will be provided.
(ii) Off-site survey teams will also perform regular Response Sector surveys to provide an ongoing picture of radiological conditions within the PZ.
(b) The Nuclear Incident Group of the Scientific Section will be responsible for the analysis of the data resulting from these surveys.
4.10.5 Provincial Agencies
(a) Assurance Monitoring Group
Headed by the Radiation Protection Service of the Ministry of Labour, this group implements monitoring programs, in areas adjacent to a radioactive release not requiring protective measures against radiation, aimed at assuring the public that air, food and water are safe (refer to Radiation Monitoring Operations Manual).
(b) General Province-Wide Monitoring Group
Headed by the Radiation Protection Service of the Ministry of Labour, this group monitors the province-wide sampling to determine the extent of radionuclide dispositions and foodstuff contamination (refer to Radiation Monitoring Operations Manual).
4.11.1 Before an emission commences, appropriate ingestion control measures will be directed as a precaution within and, if necessary, adjacent to the Primary Zone (paragraph 4.3.4).
4.11.2 If general province-wide monitoring indicates the need, appropriate ingestion control measures will be considered in areas known or suspected to be contaminated.
4.11.3 Based on the data produced by ground monitoring, additional ingestion control measures will be considered, where necessary, while the original precautionary measures may be lifted where appropriate.
4.12.1 At the commencement of an emergency resulting in the activation of this plan, the Response Sectors in the Primary Zone will be assumed to carry the following safety status (PNERP Master Plan, Annex H), based on the category of the notification initiated by DNGS:
(a) ONSITE EMERGENCY Notification with an ONGOING EMISSION
• Sectors D1 and D14 - ORANGE
• All other sectors - GREEN
(b) GENERAL EMERGENCY Notification with an ONGOING EMISSION
• Sectors D1 and D14 - RED
• Sectors D2 through D5 - ORANGE
• All other sectors - GREEN
(c) All Other Cases - If there is no ongoing emission, the sector safety status for All Sectors will be GREEN and will remain GREEN until an emission commences.
4.12.2 As soon as relevant data is available, the PEOC will reassign safety status to all the sectors and will update them periodically.
4.12.3 During the course of an emission over the land areas of the Primary Zone this updating will be done on an hourly basis. The safety status of sectors should be promptly communicated by the PEOC to all concerned.
4.12.4 It is the responsibility of each organization with emergency workers operating or required to operate in the Primary Zone to ensure that they are kept apprised of the latest/current safety status of Response Sectors.
4.12.5 The Municipal Plan shall provide for the setting up of Emergency Worker Centres (EWCs), as appropriate (PNERP Master Plan, paragraph 5.13.2 refers).
4.12.6 OPG is responsible for the monitoring and decontamination aspect of EWCs, the relevant details of which will be provided in their plans/procedures.
4.12.7 Emergency workers who need to enter a sector assigned a safety status other than GREEN should first report to an EWC, where they will be provided with personal monitoring devices and briefed on the precautions they should observe and any maximum time limit on their stay in the sector (see paragraph 4.12.1 above).
4.12.8 If an emission is ongoing, emergency services (police, fire and ambulance) who are required to operate in the Contiguous Zone (before an Emergency Worker Centre is functioning) should carry and use the following equipment:
(ii) Stable iodine tablets (one tablet to be ingested prior to entering a RED sector)
(iii) A card listing the default safety status of sectors (paragraph 4.12.1 above) and the precautions to be taken for each safety status (PNERP Master Plan, Annex H).
Municipal Plans shall detail how these emergency services will obtain these items, appropriately store them, and maintain such equipment so that it is readily available when needed. OPG is to provide assistance in obtaining and maintaining (i) and (ii) above.
4.13.1 Directions to the public on the measures they should take to ensure their safety and welfare during the emergency should be issued only by the PEOC. All other jurisdictions/organizations which have a need to issue any such directives/ advisories should forward them to the PEOC, and not issue them directly to the public.
4.13.2 Emergency Bulletins
(a) The PEOC will issue its operational directives in the form of Emergency Bulletins.
(b) To the extent possible, Emergency Bulletins should be prepared in advance of an emergency.
(c) Emergency Bulletins will be issued to the broadcast media. Copies will also be sent to the principal elements of the emergency response organization that may be affected by them.
(d) It shall be the responsibility of the PEOC Emergency Information Section to monitor the broadcast of the Emergency Bulletins and confirm that they have been correctly transmitted.
4.14.1 Lower Level Response
When the offsite response adopted is Routine Monitoring or Enhanced Monitoring (Table 3.2) all news releases on the event, prepared on behalf of the Province, shall be issued by the Director Communications Branch, MCSCS who acts as the Provincial Chief Emergency information Officer (PCEIO).
4.14.2 Higher Level Response
(a) When the offsite response adopted is Partial Activation or Full Activation, (Table 3.2), the Director of Communications Branch, MCSCS, assumes his/her role as PCEIO, establishing the Provincial Emergency Information Section (EIS), on behalf of the Province.
(b) The designated municipalities, the nuclear operator and the federal government will each have their own emergency information operation.
(c) In order to ensure the coordination and consistency of all emergency information issued to the public, these other jurisdictions or organizations should inform the Provincial EIS if they plan to issue news releases or other emergency information materials.
4.14.3 The Provincial Emergency Information Section (EIS)
(a) Located in Toronto, the Provincial EIS is responsible for ensuring that the Province’s emergency information is coordinated with the emergency information produced and disseminated by the designated municipalities, nuclear operator, federal partners and other stakeholders to ensure consistent messaging.
(b) In that regard, wherever possible and practicable, information will be shared amongst all partners prior to release
(c) The EIS functions include:
- coordinating all of the provincial communications related to the nuclear emergency;
- issuing provincial emergency information;
- sharing and coordinating emergency information with the Municipal EIC to ensure continuity and uniformity of messaging.
- Sharing copies of all news releases, fact sheets, and other public information materials with EICs prior to release to the public, if or when possible.
- Sending a liaison officer(s) to the Municipal EIC, if so requested.
- Municipal Emergency Information Centre (EIC)
- The designated (Primary Zone) municipality will establish an EIC at a Partial or Full Activation response.
- The EIC is responsible for the collection, dissemination and monitoring of local emergency information.
- The designated (Primary Zone) municipality may invite the nuclear operator, neighbouring municipalities, federal and/or provincial liaison officers to participate in the EIC operation.
- The functions of the EIC include:
- Issuing news releases and other public information documents, to the local media and residents, describing the emergency and response measures;
- Keeping the Provincial EIS informed regarding the development and distribution of news releases and other public information documents to local residents and media;
- Keeping the EIS apprised of local public perceptions, rumours, and reactions;
- Assisting media covering the emergency;
- Monitoring local media to ensure that local news is being correctly transmitted to the public by the media and confirming this with the EIS; and
- Arranging media briefings as required to communicate “key messages” to the public.
- Public Inquiry
(a) Provincial public inquiries will be coordinated by the EIS in conjunction with the Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, using Service Ontario’s hotline.
(b) The designated municipalities will be responsible for establishing their own public inquiry operation.
The PEOC can end the Response Phase of the emergency at any time after both the following conditions are met:
(a) The nuclear reactor that had the accident is in a guaranteed shutdown state.
(b) No further controlled or uncontrolled emissions at significant levels are anticipated. Generally, emissions shall be considered below a significant level if:
(i) They do not warrant the taking of any exposure control protective measures, and
(ii) They do not adversely affect public safety.
(c) The recovery phase is prescribed separately.
SECTOR BOUNDARY (north; east; south; west)
Baseline Road.; Martin Road; Lake Ontario; Courtice Road
Nash Road; Courtice Road / RR 34; Lake Ontario; Townline Road / RR 55
Nash Road; Martin Road/RR 57; Baseline Road; Courtice Road / RR 34
Concession Rd. #3; Lambs Road; Highway 2; Martin Road / RR 57
Highway 2; Lambs Road; Lake Ontario; Martin Road / RR 57
General Motors Parking Lot
Bloor Street / RR 22; Simcoe Street / RR 2; Lake Ontario; Park Road / RR 54
Bloor Street / RR 22; Townline Rd./ RR 55; Lake Ontario; Simcoe Street / RR 2
King Street; Townline Rd./ RR 55; Bloor Street / RR 22; Ritson Rd./RR16
Adelaide Ave; Townline Road / RR 55; King Street; Ritson Rd./ RR16
Taunton Rd./ RR 4; Townline Rd./ RR 55; Adelaide Avenue / RR 58; Harmony Rd./RR 33
Taunton Road / RR 4; Courtice Road / RR 34; Nash Road; Townline Road / RR 55
Taunton Road / RR 4; Martin Road / RR 57; Nash Road; Courtice Road / RR 34
Taunton Road / RR 4; Darlington-Clarke Townline / RR 42; Concession Rd. #3; Martin Road / RR 57
Concession Rd. #3&Concession Rd. #4; Wilmot Creek; Lake Ontario; Lambs Road
Note : For a diagrammatic representation, see Figure 2.3 Primary Zone and Response Sectors.
General Motors Parking Lot
Population: The estimated 2006 maximum day or night population for each sector is given. This would, in some cases, include day workers/visitors/students from outside the sector. Sector D2 includes Darlington Provincial Park.
Absorbed Dose: The amount of energy absorbed in the body, or in an organ or tissue of the body, due to exposure to ionizing radiation, divided by the respective mass of the body, organ or tissue. Expressed in terms of gray (rad).
Acute Radiation Syndrome: An acute illness caused by irradiation of the entire body (or most of the body) by a high dose of penetrating radiation in a very short period of time.
Alerting: Informing the population, by means of an appropriate signal, that a nuclear emergency has occurred or is about to occur.
Collective (Equivalent) Dose: An expression for the total radiation dose incurred by a population, defined as the product of the average radiation dose to a group of exposed persons and the number of persons in the group. Generally expressed in terms of person-sievert (or person-rem).
Committed (Equivalent) Dose: The radiation dose that will be received over a period of 50 years (for adults) or 70 years (for children) after a person takes in a quantity of radioactive material (by ingestion, absorption or inhalation). The dose is expressed in terms of sievert (or rem).
Containment (System): A series of physical barriers that exist between radioactive material contained in a nuclear installation and the environment. Containment usually refers only to the reactor and vacuum buildings, and integral systems such as dousing.
Contamination: The unwanted presence of radioactive material in water or air, or on the surfaces of structures, areas, objects or people.
Contiguous Zone: The zone immediately surrounding a nuclear installation. An increased level of emergency planning and preparedness is undertaken within this area because of its proximity to the potential hazard. The actual Contiguous Zone for each designated nuclear installation is specified in the relevant Implementing plans of the Provincial Nuclear Emergency Response Plan.
Critical Group: A particular group among the relevant population which, by virtue of age, sex or dietary habits, is expected to receive the highest dose from a stated radiation source or exposure pathway.
Crop Control: See Produce and Crop Control.
Decontamination: Reduction or removal of radioactive contamination in or on materials, persons or the environment.
Derived Emission Limits: Limits for radioactive emissions to air and water from a nuclear facility which ensure that, under normal operating conditions, Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission dose limits for members of the public are not exceeded by persons exposed to those emissions.
Designated Municipality: A municipality in the vicinity of a nuclear facility which has been designated under the Emergency Management and Civil Protection Act, as one that shall have a nuclear emergency plan (for list see PNERP Master Plan, Annex A).
Designated Nuclear Installation: A nuclear installation designated under the Emergency Management and Civil Protection Act, as one to which the specific and detailed provisions of the Provincial Nuclear Emergency Response Plan apply (for list see PNERP Master Plan, Annex A).
Dose: A measure of the radiation received or “absorbed” by a target. The quantities termed absorbed dose, organ dose, equivalent dose, effective dose, committed equivalent dose or committed effective dose are used, depending on the context. The modifying terms are often omitted when they are not necessary for defining the quantity of interest.
Dose Projection: The calculation of projected dose (see Projected Dose).
Dose Rate: The amount of radiation dose which an individual would receive in a unit of time. In the context of this Plan, the measurement units are multiples or submultiples of the sievert (or rem) per hour.
Dosimeter: An instrument for measuring and registering total accumulated exposure to ionizing radiation.
Effective (Equivalent) Dose: The sum of the weighted equivalent doses received by the organs and tissues of the body, where the weighted equivalent dose is the equivalent dose to an organ or tissue of the body multiplied by the appropriate weighting factor laid down in the Nuclear Safety and Control Act and Regulations promulgated by the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission. Expressed in terms of sievert (or rem). See Weighted Dose.
Emergency Bulletin: Directions to the public on appropriate protective and other measures to be taken during a nuclear or radiological emergency, which are issued by the province and broadcast through the media.
Emergency Workers: A person who assists in connection with an emergency that has been declared by the Lieutenant Governor in Council or the Premier, under 18.104.22.168 of the EMPCA or by the head of council of a municipality under section 4 of the EMCPA. This may include persons who are required to remain in, or to enter, offsite areas affected or likely to be affected by radiation from an accident, and for whom special safety arrangements are required. Examples of emergency workers include police, firefighters, ambulance and personnel from the Canadian Armed Forces, and other essential services. They shall not include nuclear energy workers (pursuant to the Nuclear Safety & Control Act) or assurance (ingestion) monitoring field staff.
Emergency Worker Centre: A facility set up to monitor and control radiation exposure to emergency workers.
Emission: In the context of this plan, emission refers to the release of radioactive material to the environment from a nuclear facility in the form of either an airborne or a liquid emission.
Entry Control: The prevention of non-essential persons from entering a potentially dangerous area.
Equivalent Dose: The absorbed dose multiplied by a weighting factor for the type of radiation giving the dose. Weighting factors for use in Canada are prescribed by the Atomic Energy Control Board (Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission). This term is also sometimes called weighted dose. Expressed in terms of sievert (or rem).
Evacuation: The process of leaving a potentially dangerous area.
Exposure: The act or condition of being subject to irradiation. Exposure can be either external exposure (irradiation by sources outside the body) or internal exposure (irradiation by sources inside the body).
Exposure Control: See Plume Exposure Control.
Exposure Pathways: The routes by which radioactive material can reach or irradiate humans.
External Notification: The notification of organizations and agencies (not directly part of the emergency management organization) which may be affected by a nuclear emergency, or which may be required to assist in responding to it.
Far Incident : A transborder nuclear accident or event anywhere in the world which could affect Ontario, other than a Near Incident (see Near Incident).
Field Monitoring: The assessment of the magnitude, type and extent of radiation in the environment during an emergency by such means as field surveys and field sampling.
Food Control: Measures taken to prevent the consumption of contaminated foodstuffs and control of including the supply of uncontaminated foodstuffs. Where appropriate, such control may include food storage to permit radionuclide decay, diversion of food to non-human, non-food chain use or disposal of unusable stocks.
Government Operations Centre: The federal government organization located in the National Capital Region which directs the mobilization and delivery of national support to the affected province in the case of an event in or near Canada, or which coordinates federal actions in the case of an international event.
Guaranteed Shutdown State: A reactor is considered to be in this state when there is sufficient negative reactivity to ensure sub-criticality in the event of any process failure, and approved administrative safeguards are in place to prevent net removal of negative reactivity.
Hostile Action : Any deliberate action, or threat of action, which could cause a nuclear emergency.
Host Municipality: The municipality assigned responsibility in the Provincial Nuclear Emergency Response Plan for the reception and care of people evacuated from their homes in a nuclear emergency.
Imminent Emission: A radioactive emission that will occur in 12 hours or less.
Ingestion Control: Emergency response operations in which the main aim is to avoid or reduce the risk from ingestion of contaminated food and water.
Initial Notification: The notification made by a nuclear facility to Provincial and/or municipal authorities upon the occurrence of an event or condition which has implications for public safety, or could be of concern to these authorities. The criteria and channels for making such notification are usually prescribed in emergency plans.
Internal Notification: The notification by an organization to its personnel who are required to respond to an emergency.
Land Control: Control on the use of contaminated land for growing food products or animal feed.
Livestock Control: Quarantine of livestock in the affected area to prevent movement to other areas. Slaughter of such animals for food may be banned.
Milk Control: Preventing the consumption of locally produced milk in the area affected by a nuclear emergency, and its export outside the area until it has been monitored. Collection of contaminated milk, its diversion to other uses, or its destruction, may also be involved.
Near Incident : A transborder nuclear accident or event at a site within 80 km of0 Ontario.
Notification: Conveying to a person or an organization, by means of a message, warning of the occurrence or imminence of a nuclear emergency, usually includes some indication of the measures being taken or to be taken to respond to it.
Nuclear Emergency: An emergency caused by an actual or potential hazard to public health and property or the environment from ionizing radiation or from a nuclear facility.
Nuclear Establishment: A facility that uses, produces, processes, stores or disposes of a nuclear substance, but does not include a nuclear installation. It includes, where applicable, any land, building, structures or equipment located at or forming part of the facility, and, depending on the context, the management and staff of the facility.
Nuclear Facility: A generic term covering both nuclear establishments and nuclear installations.
Nuclear Installation: A facility or a vehicle (operating in any media) containing a nuclear fission or fusion reactor (including critical and sub-critical assemblies). It includes, where applicable, any land, buildings, structures or equipment located at or forming part of the facility, and, depending on the context, the management and staff of the facility.
Nuclear Substance: As defined in the (Federal) Nuclear Safety and Control Act.
Offsite: Offsite refers to the area outside the boundary (fence) of a nuclear facility.
Onsite: Onsite refers to the area inside the boundary (fence) of a nuclear facility.
Operational Directives: Direction given by the emergency response organization to implement operational measures.
Operational Measures: Measures undertaken by the emergency response organization to deal with the emergency, including measures to enable or facilitate protective action for the public, e.g., public alerting, public direction, activation of plans, traffic control, emergency information, etc.
Operator: holder of a subsisting licence issued pursuant to the Nuclear Safety and Control Act for the operation of a nuclear installation.
Pasture Control: Removing milk- and meat-producing animals from pasture and from access to open water sources, and supplying them with uncontaminated feed and water.
Personal Monitoring: The use of radiation monitoring devices to assess whether persons, and their belongings, including vehicles, are contaminated or not, and, if contaminated, the type and level of contamination.
Plume: A cloud of airborne radioactive material that is transported in the direction of the prevailing wind from a nuclear facility. A plume results from a continuing release of radioactive gases or particles. (This term may also be used for waterborne radioactive material resulting from a liquid emission. Where the context does not make it clear, this will be referred to as a Waterborne Plume). (See also Puff).
Plume Exposure Control: Emergency operations aimed at reducing or avoiding exposure to a plume or puff of radioactive material. Measures to deal with surface contamination and re-suspension might also be included.
Precautionary Measures: Measures which will facilitate the application and effectiveness of protective measures. (For a list of some of these, see PNERP Master Plan, paragraph 2.2.7).
Primary Zone: The zone around a nuclear installation within which planning and preparedness is carried out for measures against exposure to a radioactive plume. (The Primary Zone includes the Contiguous Zone). The actual Primary Zone for each designated nuclear installation is specified in the relevant Implementing Plans of the Provincial Nuclear Emergency Response Plan.
Produce and Crop Control: Restrictions on the harvesting or processing of potentially or actually contaminated crops, vegetables and fruits. Measures include: embargoing export outside the affected area; storage to allow radionuclide decay; diversion to non-food chain use; destruction and disposal of contaminated produce.
Projected Dose: The highest committed effective equivalent dose, or committed equivalent dose to a specified organ or tissue, likely to be received through all applicable exposure pathways by the most exposed member of the critical group in the area for which the projection is being made.
Protective Action Levels (PALs): Projected dose levels which provide technical guidance on the need to take certain protective measures. For values, see PNERP Master Plan, Annex E.
Protective Measures: Measures designed to protect against exposure to radiation during a nuclear emergency. (see Table 2.1).
Puff: A plume of short duration. The distinction between a puff and a plume is a matter of time. The upper limit on the duration of a puff is half an hour. (See also Plume).
Radiation: In the context of this Plan, radiation means ionizing radiation (i.e. radiation with the potential to harm human tissue or cells produced by a nuclear substance or a nuclear facility. Radiation Exposure Control Measures, Radionuclide (or radioactive isotope or radioisotope): A naturally occurring or artificially created isotope of a chemical element having an unstable nucleus that decays, emitting alpha, beta and/or gamma rays until stability is reached.
Radiological Emergency: Emergency caused by an actual or environmental hazard from ionizing radiation emitted by a source other than a nuclear installation
Radiological Device (RDs): could be lost or stolen radioactive sources which may be in locations resulting in radiation exposure and/or contamination of the public, contamination of a site and/or contamination of food and water supplies
Radiological Dispersal Device (RDDs): A device that causes the dissemination of radioactive material.
Response Sectors: The Primary Zone is subdivided into Response Sectors to facilitate the planning and implementation of protective measures.
Restoration: Operations to restore conditions to normal after a nuclear emergency.
Secondary Zone: The zone around a nuclear installation within which it is necessary to plan and prepare measures against exposure from the ingestion of radioactive material. (The Secondary Zone includes both the Primary and Contiguous Zones). The actual Secondary Zone for each designated nuclear installation is specified in the relevant site-specific part of the Provincial Nuclear Emergency Plan.
Selective Evacuation: The evacuation of a specified group of people, such as seriously ill patients in hospitals, bedridden residents of nursing homes, or disabled residents.
Sheltering: A protective measure which uses the shielding properties of buildings and their potential for ventilation control to reduce the radiation dose to people inside.
(For details, see PNERP Master Plan, section 2.2).
Source Term: A generic term applied to the radioactive material released from a nuclear facility. It includes the quantity and type of material released as well as the timing and rate of its release. It could apply to an emission that was currently occurring, or one which had ended, or one which could take place in the future.
Special Group: A group for which special constraints arise in the application of a protective measure, such as intensive care patients in hospitals and institutions, bedridden patients in nursing homes, handicapped persons and prison inmates.
Support Municipality: Pursuant to section 7.0.2 (4) of the EMPCA, the LGIC may, by order, specify a municipality to act in a support capacity to provide assistance to designated municipality(ies).
Thyroid Blocking: The reduction or prevention of the absorption of radioiodine by the thyroid gland, which is accomplished by the intake of a stable iodine compound (such as potassium iodide) by people exposed or likely to be exposed to radioiodine.
Transborder Nuclear Emergency: A nuclear emergency involving a nuclear facility or nuclear accident or event outside the borders of Ontario that might affect people and property in the province.
Venting: The release to the atmosphere of radioactive material from the containment of a nuclear facility through systems designed for this purpose.
Vulnerable Group: A group which, because it is more vulnerable to radiation, may require protective measures not considered necessary for the general population, such as pregnant women and, in some cases, children.
Water Control: Measures taken to avoid the contamination of drinking water supplies and sources, and to prevent or reduce the consumption of contaminated water.
Weighted Dose. Expressed in terms of sievert (or rem). See Effective (Equivalent) Dose.
* Nuclear Generating Unit Schematic – CANDU Pressurized Heavy Water Reactor is a generic diagram.
* Normally applicable only to the Recovery Phase.
3 1 The term ‘practically 100%’ means that the signal can be heard by everyone in the alerting area unless exceptional circumstances, as hearing impairment, loud machinery operations etc., provide an impediment.
4 2 The term ‘area wide basis’ means that the alert signal will cover that geographical area as defined, but does not presume that practically 100% of all persons within that geographical area will necessarily hear the public alerting signal.
5 Major Organization Plan under the PNERP
6 Major Organizational Plan under the PNERP
7 Blow back of radioactivity would occur as a result of a shift in the wind direction from offshore back towards the shoreline.